Are ethical values culturally relative?
Posted: Fri May 04, 2007 2:26 pm
Hi Girls:
The following is an excerpt from "The Teaching Company." They provide recorded media in the form of college level courses for those that wish to continue with their education in an informal manner. No credit assigned. The best of the best Professors are invited to record their lessons and "The Teaching Company", sells them as an end result.
http://www.teach12.com
A link to the web site offering a plethora of courses that are designed for any mature adult.
The excerpt provided is from such a course of material. My intention is to demonstrate that as a community, we may at one time have been more accepted by others. With change comes change in the cultural biases that appear throughout history. This is demonstrated by Prof. Grim in various comparisons of cultural behavior.
Professor Grim:
Questions of Value
Lecture 10 Excerpt: Ethical Relativism
by Professor Patrick Grim
Are ethical values culturally relative? An affirmative answer to that question is Ethical Relativism, the claim that ethical values are indeed relative to culture. But as long as the phrase "relative to" goes unclarified, what this gives us is not a clear, single claim, but a vague family of claims, hidden in a fog of ambiguity.
When we penetrate the conceptual fog and carefully separate the questions, we find a great deal of insight and truth in Relativism. We also find some of the most dangerous ethical mistakes that it is possible to make.
Let me begin with a form of Relativism that is both interesting and has the best shot at being true: An action that is right in one culture may be wrong in another. This is not merely the claim that cultures disagree in their beliefs about what is right and wrong; this is the claim that what is really right in one culture may really be wrong in another. The reason why this is true is because some issues of right and wrong hinge on culturally and historically contingent factors.
The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre suggests the example of usury. If you search among medieval manuscripts for the most heinous of medieval sins, you will find murder, adultery, blasphemy, and usury. Medieval canon law reserves some of its strongest prohibitions and condemnations toward this horrible crime. Amongst the small number of offenses for which the Spanish Inquisition used torture to force confessions were heresy, witchcraft, bigamy, and usury. What is this horrible sin? Usury is simply lending money at interest. Not exorbitant interest in the sense of loan sharking, but lending money at any interest at all. What MacIntyre suggests is that this was not merely a medieval moral mistake. It was not that the people of the Middle Ages were simply in error, thinking money lending to be evil in ways that it was not. What MacIntyre suggests is that in the medieval context, usury was not merely thought to be a vice, usury was a genuine vice.
Seigniorialism, the economic system of feudal society, was an economy based entirely on land-ownership and a hierarchy of protection and reciprocal allegiance. At the head was the king, beneath him a hierarchy of nobles and lesser nobles, beneath them the seigniors in their manor houses, and their serfs. The serfs were granted the use of the land and the seigniors' protection in return for the economical support of the manor house and of the hierarchy above it. The ideal of that seigniorial system is a self-contained and enclosed economy, an economy that is stable and unchanging. In the ideal of Seigniorialism, there are no imports and exports, no sales. Seigniorialism knows no notion of economic growth.
In a context of that kind of economy, MacIntyre suggests, lending money at interest was a genuine threat to social stability. If a manor or a noble borrows money at interest, there will be no way to pay it back. In that kind of economy, usury, then, is a genuine vice. In contrast, a capitalistic economy like ours is by definition based on the idea of return interest on money, so we do not view usury as a vice at all. It is because of different cultural circumstances, in this case a different economic culture, where something that really is a vice in one context is not in another.
Simple cases like this show that the first form of Relativism is true. There are indeed some actions, the ethical status of which depends on cultural and historical factors. There are some things that are genuinely right in one cultural or historical context and genuinely wrong in another.
Unfortunately, this true and guarded claim is not the form in which Relativism is usually introduced. Relativism is generally put forward as if we were speaking not merely of some values but as if we were speaking of all values. This is the claim of Universal Relativism, that all values are culturally relative: that there is no value that isn't merely a matter of one's culture. In this absolute and universal form, Relativism does not bring insight and truth, but rather a blizzard of conceptual confusions which we need to disentangle.
There are three very different positions that tend to get tangled. The first position is Descriptive Relativism: This is the claim that different cultures differ in their fundamental ethical beliefs. It is the claim that what is believed to be right and wrong varies from culture to culture.
The second position is Ethical Relativism proper: the claim that an action is morally right in one culture may be wrong in another. This claim goes beyond mere matters of belief. It is the philosophical claim that what is right in one culture is not only believed to be wrong in another but really is wrong in another.
Everyone knows the distinction between belief and reality; for example, between whether it is believed that the Earth is flat and whether it really is. The question of whether there were historical periods in which it was believed the Earth was flat is a very different matter from whether there were historical periods in which the Earth really was flat. The analogy here is this: Descriptive Relativism is like the position that there were historical periods in which it was believed that the world was flat. Ethical Relativism is like the position that there were historical periods in which it really was flat, except, of course, we are talking about ethics.
The third position in the tangle is Prescriptive Relativism. Prescriptive Relativism is the claim in which it is wrong to condemn or pass judgment on those with different cultural values. In universal form, it is the claim that it is always wrong to pass judgment on another culture.
So what we are dealing with are three importantly different positions that sound alike. They also tend to travel together as parts of a single bad argument, and it is philosophically important to diffuse it. The argument is often given as if it were a proof, a series of logical steps that prove a conclusion. It runs something like this:
• Step 1: Different cultures differ in their fundamental ethical beliefs.
• Step 2: An action right in one culture may therefore be wrong in another culture. There are no universal moral truths; what is right and wrong varies from culture to culture.
• Step 3: It is therefore wrong to condemn or pass judgment on those with different ethical values.
Note that the first step is Descriptive Relativism: a statement about beliefs. Different cultures differ in their fundamental ethical beliefs. The second step is presented as if it were derived from step 1: an action right in one culture may be therefore wrong in another culture. That is Ethical Relativism presented in its full universal form. There are no universal moral truths; what is right and wrong varies from culture to culture. The third step is treated as a deduction from the second and it is Prescriptive Relativism: It is therefore wrong to condemn or pass judgment on those with different ethical values.
This argument is, in the end, a fallacious argument. It is presented as if it was a proof, but the steps do not really follow. It is, however, an argument with a long intellectual history. Something like that standard argument can be found as far back the work of Sextus Empiricus writing about 200 A.D. Sextus Empiricus is a Skeptic. Skepticism was revived in the Renaissance, most notably in the mid-1500s in the essays of Michel de Montaigne. Montaigne, like Sextus before him, starts with a catalogue, a blizzard, of listed cultural differences. That is the first step, the Descriptive Relativism step, a listing of cultural differences. Many of those seem funny today because Montaigne took them uncritically from everywhere: from classical sources, from legends, and from travelers' tall tales. So with a straight face, Montaigne tells us of people in the New Indies (he means America) who raise fattened spiders for food: "They cook them and prepare them with various sauces." He tells of other nations in which our meats and foods are fatally poisonous. He says:
There are countries where, except for his wife and children, no one speaks to the king except through a tube... where people greet one another by putting their finger into the ground and then raising it to heaven. Where the men carry their burdens on their heads, and women on their shoulders, and where women piss standing, men squatting. Where they cook the body of the deceased and then crush it until a sort of pulp is formed, which they mix with their wine, and drink it.
From this litany of cultural differences, taken uncritically from sources solid and unsolid, real and imagined, Montaigne draws the Ethical Relativism conclusion, that custom has no rational or ethical basis. He says: "In short, to my way of thinking, there is nothing that custom will not or cannot do." Indeed, we should be wary of the dictates of our own conscience because that is as much shaped by our culture as anything else. Montaigne says: "The laws of conscience, which we say are born of nature, are born of custom."
The move from Descriptive Relativism to Ethical Relativism is also central to the work of the Marquis de Sade. De Sade's Justine alternates chapters of increasingly violent pornography with chapters in which figures of authority outline how different cultures hold different beliefs, so nothing is really wrong. So it is perfectly acceptable to inflict pain onto someone else in order to heighten one's sexual pleasure, to find pleasure while watching people burned to death. It is from de Sade of course that our term "sadism" comes.
Of course the argument from Descriptive Relativism to Ethical Relativism doesn't just appear in historical sources. It appears in philosophical conversations every day. There is an important point in which one becomes aware of different ways of living. One becomes aware that the pattern to which one is acculturated is not universally accepted and probably should not be. That crucial realization is often expressed, rightly or wrongly, in a move like this from Descriptive Relativism to Ethical Relativism. From "different cultures have different values" to "no set of values is any better or worse than any other" and perhaps from there to "would it be wrong to judge?"
Now when examined carefully, it is clear this argument is a bad one. It is simply not the proof it purports to be. There are three ways in which the argument fails.
The first problem. Step 1 is: Different cultures differ in their fundamental and ethical beliefs. Step 2 concludes that there are therefore no universal moral truths. In order for the argument to get even as far as that second step—the claim that there are no universal moral truths—it is not enough that there are some differences in fundamental ethical beliefs. In order to get to a conclusion that there are no moral truths across cultures, we would at least need a premise that there is no ethical agreement that holds across cultures.
All of the classical sources—Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, and the Marquis de Sade—offer a string of intriguing anecdotal stories about surprising cultural disagreements. But in order to establish an unqualified Descriptive Relativism, one would have to show that absolutely every ethical claim made in one culture is contradicted in some other culture.
Are things that different? Is there really a culture that believes, for example, that the ethical thing to do is to kill children for sport? Is there a culture that takes it as an ethical truth than one ought always to try to harm oneself? Or one where we have an obligation to lie to each other whenever possible? Is there a culture that prohibits the passing on of cultural traditions? No. There are no cultures that hold any of those things. Indeed it is not clear that any culture could hold such beliefs. The cultures that we find across the globe are cultures that have had to survive and perpetuate themselves. Any culture that killed its own children couldn't self-perpetuate. Any culture that had no presumption of truth-telling could not pass on information. Any culture that had an injunction against passing on cultural knowledge would be a culture that is bent on its own destruction.
There is a sense, then, in which the argument doesn't even get off the ground. We do not have reason to believe the unqualified Descriptive Relativism that would be necessary to give us the unqualified Ethical Relativism that appears in step 2. That's one problem.
The second problem is that the argument would be still fallacious anyway because the move from the first step, where different cultures differ in fundamental ethical beliefs, to the conclusion in the second step, that there are therefore no universal moral truths, is a move from belief to truth. The transition from the first step to the second is still a transition from supposed facts about differences in ethical beliefs to the ethical claim that nothing is universally right or wrong across cultures. The move from the first step to the second, then, is a move from facts about cultural beliefs to a claim about ethics—about what really is right or wrong.
But it doesn't follow from the fact that different cultures disagree about whether the Earth is flat that there is no geological fact of the matter; it doesn't follow from the fact that different cultures disagree about whether infants inherit characteristics from both parents that there are no biological facts regarding genetic inheritance. In precisely the same way, it doesn't follow that because there are cultural disagreements regarding ethics that there is no ethical truth applicable across cultures. The move from disagreement in belief to claims regarding reality independent of belief is as fallacious in the ethical case as it is in the others.
A third problem is in the move from the second step to the third: from Ethical Relativism to Prescriptive Relativism. The claim in step 2 is that there are no universal moral truths, that nothing is universally right or wrong. The claim in step 3 is that there is something that is always wrong: the act of passing judgment on those with different cultural values. So far from step 2 leading to step 3, those two claims cannot possibly be true together. Far from supporting Prescriptive Relativism, Ethical Relativism contradicts it. If it is always wrong to pass judgment on others, then there is something that is always wrong. On the other hand if nothing is universally right or wrong, it cannot be universally wrong to pass judgment on another culture.
The argument about usury is a qualified, rather than a universal, form of Ethical Relativism. It is a defensible claim because there are some things the ethical status of which genuinely differs with cultural contexts. If a qualified claim can be right, a qualified form of Prescriptive Relativism can also be right. It is problematic to pass quick or precipitate judgments on those who have different values or to peremptorily try to make them conform to one's own. Given different cultural contexts, different values may be as valid as one's own. The idea is: Be careful.
The whole topic of Relativism can be seen as a case in which people's standard motivations are usually right. But their explicit formulations, the unqualified claims they actually make, are almost always wrong. In unqualified or universal form, both Ethical and Prescriptive Relativism turn out to be deeply contestable, and the standard argument used to support them is a tissue of fallacious reasoning. On the other hand, in their qualified forms, Ethical Relativism and Prescriptive Relativism amount to a plea for cultural sensitivity and a warning against precipitated judgments.
End.....................
Hugs
Danielle Marie
The following is an excerpt from "The Teaching Company." They provide recorded media in the form of college level courses for those that wish to continue with their education in an informal manner. No credit assigned. The best of the best Professors are invited to record their lessons and "The Teaching Company", sells them as an end result.
http://www.teach12.com
A link to the web site offering a plethora of courses that are designed for any mature adult.
The excerpt provided is from such a course of material. My intention is to demonstrate that as a community, we may at one time have been more accepted by others. With change comes change in the cultural biases that appear throughout history. This is demonstrated by Prof. Grim in various comparisons of cultural behavior.
Professor Grim:
Questions of Value
Lecture 10 Excerpt: Ethical Relativism
by Professor Patrick Grim
Are ethical values culturally relative? An affirmative answer to that question is Ethical Relativism, the claim that ethical values are indeed relative to culture. But as long as the phrase "relative to" goes unclarified, what this gives us is not a clear, single claim, but a vague family of claims, hidden in a fog of ambiguity.
When we penetrate the conceptual fog and carefully separate the questions, we find a great deal of insight and truth in Relativism. We also find some of the most dangerous ethical mistakes that it is possible to make.
Let me begin with a form of Relativism that is both interesting and has the best shot at being true: An action that is right in one culture may be wrong in another. This is not merely the claim that cultures disagree in their beliefs about what is right and wrong; this is the claim that what is really right in one culture may really be wrong in another. The reason why this is true is because some issues of right and wrong hinge on culturally and historically contingent factors.
The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre suggests the example of usury. If you search among medieval manuscripts for the most heinous of medieval sins, you will find murder, adultery, blasphemy, and usury. Medieval canon law reserves some of its strongest prohibitions and condemnations toward this horrible crime. Amongst the small number of offenses for which the Spanish Inquisition used torture to force confessions were heresy, witchcraft, bigamy, and usury. What is this horrible sin? Usury is simply lending money at interest. Not exorbitant interest in the sense of loan sharking, but lending money at any interest at all. What MacIntyre suggests is that this was not merely a medieval moral mistake. It was not that the people of the Middle Ages were simply in error, thinking money lending to be evil in ways that it was not. What MacIntyre suggests is that in the medieval context, usury was not merely thought to be a vice, usury was a genuine vice.
Seigniorialism, the economic system of feudal society, was an economy based entirely on land-ownership and a hierarchy of protection and reciprocal allegiance. At the head was the king, beneath him a hierarchy of nobles and lesser nobles, beneath them the seigniors in their manor houses, and their serfs. The serfs were granted the use of the land and the seigniors' protection in return for the economical support of the manor house and of the hierarchy above it. The ideal of that seigniorial system is a self-contained and enclosed economy, an economy that is stable and unchanging. In the ideal of Seigniorialism, there are no imports and exports, no sales. Seigniorialism knows no notion of economic growth.
In a context of that kind of economy, MacIntyre suggests, lending money at interest was a genuine threat to social stability. If a manor or a noble borrows money at interest, there will be no way to pay it back. In that kind of economy, usury, then, is a genuine vice. In contrast, a capitalistic economy like ours is by definition based on the idea of return interest on money, so we do not view usury as a vice at all. It is because of different cultural circumstances, in this case a different economic culture, where something that really is a vice in one context is not in another.
Simple cases like this show that the first form of Relativism is true. There are indeed some actions, the ethical status of which depends on cultural and historical factors. There are some things that are genuinely right in one cultural or historical context and genuinely wrong in another.
Unfortunately, this true and guarded claim is not the form in which Relativism is usually introduced. Relativism is generally put forward as if we were speaking not merely of some values but as if we were speaking of all values. This is the claim of Universal Relativism, that all values are culturally relative: that there is no value that isn't merely a matter of one's culture. In this absolute and universal form, Relativism does not bring insight and truth, but rather a blizzard of conceptual confusions which we need to disentangle.
There are three very different positions that tend to get tangled. The first position is Descriptive Relativism: This is the claim that different cultures differ in their fundamental ethical beliefs. It is the claim that what is believed to be right and wrong varies from culture to culture.
The second position is Ethical Relativism proper: the claim that an action is morally right in one culture may be wrong in another. This claim goes beyond mere matters of belief. It is the philosophical claim that what is right in one culture is not only believed to be wrong in another but really is wrong in another.
Everyone knows the distinction between belief and reality; for example, between whether it is believed that the Earth is flat and whether it really is. The question of whether there were historical periods in which it was believed the Earth was flat is a very different matter from whether there were historical periods in which the Earth really was flat. The analogy here is this: Descriptive Relativism is like the position that there were historical periods in which it was believed that the world was flat. Ethical Relativism is like the position that there were historical periods in which it really was flat, except, of course, we are talking about ethics.
The third position in the tangle is Prescriptive Relativism. Prescriptive Relativism is the claim in which it is wrong to condemn or pass judgment on those with different cultural values. In universal form, it is the claim that it is always wrong to pass judgment on another culture.
So what we are dealing with are three importantly different positions that sound alike. They also tend to travel together as parts of a single bad argument, and it is philosophically important to diffuse it. The argument is often given as if it were a proof, a series of logical steps that prove a conclusion. It runs something like this:
• Step 1: Different cultures differ in their fundamental ethical beliefs.
• Step 2: An action right in one culture may therefore be wrong in another culture. There are no universal moral truths; what is right and wrong varies from culture to culture.
• Step 3: It is therefore wrong to condemn or pass judgment on those with different ethical values.
Note that the first step is Descriptive Relativism: a statement about beliefs. Different cultures differ in their fundamental ethical beliefs. The second step is presented as if it were derived from step 1: an action right in one culture may be therefore wrong in another culture. That is Ethical Relativism presented in its full universal form. There are no universal moral truths; what is right and wrong varies from culture to culture. The third step is treated as a deduction from the second and it is Prescriptive Relativism: It is therefore wrong to condemn or pass judgment on those with different ethical values.
This argument is, in the end, a fallacious argument. It is presented as if it was a proof, but the steps do not really follow. It is, however, an argument with a long intellectual history. Something like that standard argument can be found as far back the work of Sextus Empiricus writing about 200 A.D. Sextus Empiricus is a Skeptic. Skepticism was revived in the Renaissance, most notably in the mid-1500s in the essays of Michel de Montaigne. Montaigne, like Sextus before him, starts with a catalogue, a blizzard, of listed cultural differences. That is the first step, the Descriptive Relativism step, a listing of cultural differences. Many of those seem funny today because Montaigne took them uncritically from everywhere: from classical sources, from legends, and from travelers' tall tales. So with a straight face, Montaigne tells us of people in the New Indies (he means America) who raise fattened spiders for food: "They cook them and prepare them with various sauces." He tells of other nations in which our meats and foods are fatally poisonous. He says:
There are countries where, except for his wife and children, no one speaks to the king except through a tube... where people greet one another by putting their finger into the ground and then raising it to heaven. Where the men carry their burdens on their heads, and women on their shoulders, and where women piss standing, men squatting. Where they cook the body of the deceased and then crush it until a sort of pulp is formed, which they mix with their wine, and drink it.
From this litany of cultural differences, taken uncritically from sources solid and unsolid, real and imagined, Montaigne draws the Ethical Relativism conclusion, that custom has no rational or ethical basis. He says: "In short, to my way of thinking, there is nothing that custom will not or cannot do." Indeed, we should be wary of the dictates of our own conscience because that is as much shaped by our culture as anything else. Montaigne says: "The laws of conscience, which we say are born of nature, are born of custom."
The move from Descriptive Relativism to Ethical Relativism is also central to the work of the Marquis de Sade. De Sade's Justine alternates chapters of increasingly violent pornography with chapters in which figures of authority outline how different cultures hold different beliefs, so nothing is really wrong. So it is perfectly acceptable to inflict pain onto someone else in order to heighten one's sexual pleasure, to find pleasure while watching people burned to death. It is from de Sade of course that our term "sadism" comes.
Of course the argument from Descriptive Relativism to Ethical Relativism doesn't just appear in historical sources. It appears in philosophical conversations every day. There is an important point in which one becomes aware of different ways of living. One becomes aware that the pattern to which one is acculturated is not universally accepted and probably should not be. That crucial realization is often expressed, rightly or wrongly, in a move like this from Descriptive Relativism to Ethical Relativism. From "different cultures have different values" to "no set of values is any better or worse than any other" and perhaps from there to "would it be wrong to judge?"
Now when examined carefully, it is clear this argument is a bad one. It is simply not the proof it purports to be. There are three ways in which the argument fails.
The first problem. Step 1 is: Different cultures differ in their fundamental and ethical beliefs. Step 2 concludes that there are therefore no universal moral truths. In order for the argument to get even as far as that second step—the claim that there are no universal moral truths—it is not enough that there are some differences in fundamental ethical beliefs. In order to get to a conclusion that there are no moral truths across cultures, we would at least need a premise that there is no ethical agreement that holds across cultures.
All of the classical sources—Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, and the Marquis de Sade—offer a string of intriguing anecdotal stories about surprising cultural disagreements. But in order to establish an unqualified Descriptive Relativism, one would have to show that absolutely every ethical claim made in one culture is contradicted in some other culture.
Are things that different? Is there really a culture that believes, for example, that the ethical thing to do is to kill children for sport? Is there a culture that takes it as an ethical truth than one ought always to try to harm oneself? Or one where we have an obligation to lie to each other whenever possible? Is there a culture that prohibits the passing on of cultural traditions? No. There are no cultures that hold any of those things. Indeed it is not clear that any culture could hold such beliefs. The cultures that we find across the globe are cultures that have had to survive and perpetuate themselves. Any culture that killed its own children couldn't self-perpetuate. Any culture that had no presumption of truth-telling could not pass on information. Any culture that had an injunction against passing on cultural knowledge would be a culture that is bent on its own destruction.
There is a sense, then, in which the argument doesn't even get off the ground. We do not have reason to believe the unqualified Descriptive Relativism that would be necessary to give us the unqualified Ethical Relativism that appears in step 2. That's one problem.
The second problem is that the argument would be still fallacious anyway because the move from the first step, where different cultures differ in fundamental ethical beliefs, to the conclusion in the second step, that there are therefore no universal moral truths, is a move from belief to truth. The transition from the first step to the second is still a transition from supposed facts about differences in ethical beliefs to the ethical claim that nothing is universally right or wrong across cultures. The move from the first step to the second, then, is a move from facts about cultural beliefs to a claim about ethics—about what really is right or wrong.
But it doesn't follow from the fact that different cultures disagree about whether the Earth is flat that there is no geological fact of the matter; it doesn't follow from the fact that different cultures disagree about whether infants inherit characteristics from both parents that there are no biological facts regarding genetic inheritance. In precisely the same way, it doesn't follow that because there are cultural disagreements regarding ethics that there is no ethical truth applicable across cultures. The move from disagreement in belief to claims regarding reality independent of belief is as fallacious in the ethical case as it is in the others.
A third problem is in the move from the second step to the third: from Ethical Relativism to Prescriptive Relativism. The claim in step 2 is that there are no universal moral truths, that nothing is universally right or wrong. The claim in step 3 is that there is something that is always wrong: the act of passing judgment on those with different cultural values. So far from step 2 leading to step 3, those two claims cannot possibly be true together. Far from supporting Prescriptive Relativism, Ethical Relativism contradicts it. If it is always wrong to pass judgment on others, then there is something that is always wrong. On the other hand if nothing is universally right or wrong, it cannot be universally wrong to pass judgment on another culture.
The argument about usury is a qualified, rather than a universal, form of Ethical Relativism. It is a defensible claim because there are some things the ethical status of which genuinely differs with cultural contexts. If a qualified claim can be right, a qualified form of Prescriptive Relativism can also be right. It is problematic to pass quick or precipitate judgments on those who have different values or to peremptorily try to make them conform to one's own. Given different cultural contexts, different values may be as valid as one's own. The idea is: Be careful.
The whole topic of Relativism can be seen as a case in which people's standard motivations are usually right. But their explicit formulations, the unqualified claims they actually make, are almost always wrong. In unqualified or universal form, both Ethical and Prescriptive Relativism turn out to be deeply contestable, and the standard argument used to support them is a tissue of fallacious reasoning. On the other hand, in their qualified forms, Ethical Relativism and Prescriptive Relativism amount to a plea for cultural sensitivity and a warning against precipitated judgments.
End.....................
Hugs
Danielle Marie